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CASES NOTED
longer true. Members of the armed forces had the right to counsel 5 long
before such right was given to the civilian,46 whether he is indigent or
not."7
The criticism that the courts-martial are under direct command in-
fluence because the convening authority appoints both the defense and
the prosecution is also unfair. Actually, such criticism can be leveled at
the civil courts as well; the public defenders, state attorneys, judges, and
even the jury are all paid and "convened" by the same party, the state.
Although it is historically true that courts-martial jurisdiction
should be limited solely to "service-connected offenses," this is not be-
cause they are instruments of discipline rather than justice; a more ra-
tional explanation is that courts-martial, by their very nature, are limited
as to their jurisdiction, as are all courts.
GEORGE A. KOKUS
IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF BANKS NOT TO
DISCLOSE INFORMATION TO THIRD PARTIES
CONCERNING ITS DEPOSITORS' ACCOUNTS
Plaintiffs (depositors) alleged that the defendant bank negligently,
willfully or maliciously, or intentionally divulged information concerning
their accounts to third parties. The third parties then sued the plaintiffs
and enjoined the bank from distributing any of plaintiffs' monies on
deposit, whereby plaintiffs suffered damages equal to the cost of settle-
ment of that suit and attorneys' fees expended in defense thereof. The
trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action and denied plain-
tiffs' motion for a rehearing. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held, reversed and remanded: A complaint which alleges
that a bank negligently, willfully or maliciously, or intentionally divulged
information concerning plaintiffs' accounts to third parties states a cause
of action upon which relief can be granted, upon the theory that the
bank breached its implied contractual promise of nondisclosure. Miloh-
nich v. First National Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
The relationship existing between a bank and its depositors is gen-
erally considered to be that of debtor and creditor,' and it arises only out
45. Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, art. 32, 64 Stat. 118.
46. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
47. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629 (1967). For further reforms within the
military law see Bellin, The Revolution in Military Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 1194 (1968).
1. See cases collected at 10 Am. JuR. 2d Banks & Banking § 339 n.l (1963).
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of contract, express or implied.2 In this contractual relationship, how-
ever, greater rights and obligations exist than those that are found in the
ordinary debtor and creditor relationship.3
Even though the bank-depositor relationship is generally recognized
as a debtor-creditor contractual relationship and numerous courts have
held that a bank owes a greater duty than an ordinary debtor,4 there is
relatively little reported law on the issue of whether that contractual
relationship includes an implied obligation of the bank not to disclose
information concerning its depositors' accounts.
The leading English case on the subject is Tournier v. National Pro-
vincial & Union Bank,5 in which a unanimous court, remarking on the
lack of authority directly on point, held that a duty on the bank not to
disclose the depositor's account or transactions relating thereto, except
in certain circumstances, was implied in the banker's contract with his
customers.' Likewise, in an earlier case, the jury found the bank liable
for unauthorized disclosure when it allowed the payee of two checks to
pay into the drawer (plaintiff's) account an amount equal to the differ-
ence between the balance in the account and the sum of the two checks.7
However, where the bank disclosed to a moneylender that the depositor
was overdrawn, hoping to obtain the moneylender's assistance for the
depositor, it was held that such a communication was made on a reason-
able and proper occasion. 8
In a situation very similar to the instant case, a third party, after dis-
closure, requested the bank not to pay out further funds. This resulted
in several of plaintiff's checks being dishonored. The English court failed
to acknowledge plaintiff's claim that such disclosure violated the bank's
implied contractual duty, but nevertheless allowed recovery for the
bank's wrongful dishonor.
2. See cases collected at 10 Am. JuR. 2d Banks & Banking § 337 n.18 (1963).
3. "The relation existing between a bank and its depositors is, in a strict sense, that of
debtor and creditor; but in discharging its obligation as a debtor the bank must do so sub-
ject to the rules obtaining between principal and agent." Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100
N.Y. 50, 53, 2 N.E. 881, 881 (1855).
"Ordinarily, the relation between a bank and its depositors is that of debtor and
creditor. . . . However, a bank deposit is more than an ordinary debt, and the depositor's
relation to the bank is not identical with that of an ordinary creditor." Gibraltar Realty
Corp. v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 353, 356; 12 N.E. 2d 438, 439 (1938).
4. See note 3 supra and the cases collected at 10 Am. JuR. 2d Banks & Banking § 339
nn.19 & 20 (1963).
5. [1924] 1 K.B. 461.
6. The exceptions enumerated by the Tournier court were as follows:
(a) Where disclosure is under compulsion by law;
(b) Where there is a duty to the public to disclose;
(c) Where the interests of the bank require disclosure; and
(d) Where the depositor expressly or impliedly consents to the disclosure. Id. at 473.
7. Foster v. Bank of London, 176 Eng. Rep. 96 (N.P. 1862).
8. Hardy v. Veasy [1868] L.R. 3 Ex. 107, cited frequently in Tournier v. Nat'l Provin-
cial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461.
9. Tassell v. Cooper, 137 Eng. Rep. 990 (Ex. 1850). In the instant case there is no
showing that the plaintiff attempted to draw on his account, but even if he had, recovery
for wrongful dishonor would be unlikely because the defendant bank was legally enjoined
from distributing plaintiff's monies. In the Tassell case, however, the bank dishonored the
plaintiff's check at the request of the third party.
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American opinion on the subject has been divergent in its analysis,
and no less than four different theories have been advanced as to the
nature and scope of the duty owed to the depositor by the bank.
Without discussing the propriety of the disclosure as such, one group
of decisions has viewed an unauthorized disclosure as giving rise to an
action for libel or slander.'0 Generally, these cases allow a bank to dis-
close, absent bad faith or malice on the bank's part," but where the dis-
closure was false and the bank knew it, this qualified privilege was held
inapplicable.' -
Another theory, advanced by the New Jersey equity court but not
relied on since, viewed the depositor as having a property right in the in-
formation contained in his account, and therefore disclosure (upon re-
quest by a public prosecutor) was improper. 3
A third view is advanced by the banking industry itself. This view
follows a conservative policy of nondisclosure on the theory that any
communication from depositor to bank is as privileged 4 as is the attorney-
client relationship. Courts have not been receptive to this ultraconserva-
tive policy and have often rejected it, allowing disclosure: of general
credit information upon the consent of the depositor;' under the com-
mon-law right of a stockholder to examine the corporation's books and
records;' 6 to another bank, for whom the depositor's bank became a col-
lection agent; ' 7 under subpoena;" and to the Internal Revenue Service
pursuant to an income tax investigation. 9
10. Ritchie v. Arnold, 79 Ill. App. 406 (1898); Deal v. Bank of Smithville, 52 S.W.2d
201 (Mo. 1932) ; Sewall v. Catlin, 3 Wend. 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) ; First State Bank v.
Parker, 28 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); see also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383 (1960).
11. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
12. Froslee v. Lund's State Bank, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915).
13. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
14. See, e.g., 1 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 619 (4th ed. 1940), where it is
stated: "A bank should, as a general policy, consider information concerning its customers
as confidential, which it should not disclose to others without clear justification." Paton,
however, is of the opinion that "[a] bank disclosing to the holder of an overdraft the balance
in the drawer's account is apparently not liable to the drawor."
See also J. BRADY, THE LAW OF BANK CHnCxs 332 n.7 (Bailey 4th ed. 1969); Limburg,
The Bankers' and the Brokers' Privilege, 25 CoLuM. L. REV. 152 (1925); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ala. 1946), as discussed in note 19 infra.
15. Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank, 98 F. 562 (6th Cir. 1899). The weight of authority,
however, is to the effect that a bank may not act as a credit agency for third parties without
the express or implied consent of the depositor. Sparks v. Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478,
124 S.E.2d 365 (1962); People's Nat'l Bank v. Southern State Fin. Co., 192 N.C. 69, 133
S.E. 415 (1926). See also, Annot. 48 A.L.R. 528 (1927).
16. Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905) ; State ex rel. G. M. Gustafson Co. v.
Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 (1946). At least one state has abolished
this right by statute, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 5-1035 (1947).
17. Grant County Deposit Bank v. Greene, 200 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1952); cf. Irby v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 239 Miss. 64, 121 So.2d 118 (1960).
18. In re Davies, 68 Kan: 791, 75 P. 1048 (1904); Smith v. Dawson, 234 S.W. 690,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1450 (1937).
19. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ala. 1946). Even though
the court held that banks were obligated to cooperate with Internal Revenue Service
agents in proper cases, the court recognized the bank's obligation to its depositors:
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The fourth and most recent view was expressed by the Idaho Su-
preme Court in Peterson v. First National Bank,20 the single American
precedent squarely on point with the instant case. In Peterson, the court
held that a disclosure not authorized either by law or by the depositor
breaches the bank's implied contractual duty not to disclose. This deci-
sion provided the court in the instant case with an American counterpart
to the Tournier decision referred to above.2'
In the instant case, Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, the court, taking
care to point out that the Uniform Commercial Code did not apply to
the case,22 relied on the two leading precedents, Peterson v. First National
Bank23 and Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank,24 and held
that the duty of nondisclosure is derived from the implied contractual
relation between the bank and its customers. In doing so, however, the
court recognized that disclosure may be proper under certain circum-
stances, such as disclosure relating to loan information, safe-deposit
rentals, general credit information between banks, disclosure required
by statute or under court compulsion, and disclosure made with the
express or implied consent of the depositor.
Milohnich neither enlarges nor restricts the scope of the duty of a
bank as set forth in Peterson and Tournier, but when placed in tandem
with these decisions it provides both banks and their customers a firmer
body of case law on a subject which is not likely to be litigated frequently
due to the banking industry's general policy of nondisclosure. 25
Although the rationale of the court's decision is contrary to the argu-
ment that the nature of an action for unauthorized disclosure is tortious,26
the decision is nevertheless acceptable. Whichever legal theory is fol-
All agree that a bank should protect its business records from the prying eyes of the
public, moved by curiosity or malice. No one questions its right to protect its
fiduciary relationship with its customers, which, in sound banking practice, as a
matter of common knowledge, is done everywhere. Id. at 624.
20. 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961), where the disclosure was to the depositor's em-
ployer. The case is noted in Note, A Bank-Depositor's Right of Sanctity, 39 U. DT. L.J. 590
21. See notes 5 and 6 supra and accompanying text. Even though the Peterson case ap-
pears to stand alone, it is supported by the following statement contained in 10 AM. JUR.2d
Banks & Banking § 332 (1963):
Indeed, it is an implied term of the contract between a banker and his customer
that the banker will not divulge to third persons without the consent of the
customer, express or implied, either the state of the customer's account or any of
his transactions with the bank, or any information relating to the customer acquired
through the keeping of his account, unless the banker is compelled to do so by
order of a court ....
22. 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). The plaintiff was a depositor from January 29,
1962 until November 1, 1966. Florida adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1967. Never-
theless, this author's opinion is that nothing contained in the Uniform Commercial Code
would affect the result of this case.
23. 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
24. [1924] 1 K.B. 461.
25. See note 14 supra.
26. Pearson, J., concurring specially in the instant case, rejected the analysis that the
action lay for breach of contract and urged instead that the bank committed a business
tort. 224 So.2d at 763. See also Note, A Bank-Depositor's Right of Sanctity, 39 U. DET. L.J.
590 (1962).
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lowed," a cause of action in favor of the depositor arises when unauthor-
ized disclosure occurs. Moreover, the court's conception of the bank's
disclosure as a breach of an implied contract follows what appears to
be the most recently expounded judicial view.28 Consequently, this case,
along with the Peterson and Tournier decisions, may provide the nucleus
of the beginning of the end of an era of uncertainty.
STEPHEN J. KOLSKI
LIABILITY OF HARMLESS COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
TO THIRD PARTY
Plaintiff was injured by an explosion of a water repellent compound
which contained two percent "Tyzor HS," a harmless component devel-
oped by the defendant, E.I. DuPont, and ninety-eight percent Shell
Sol B. The compound was manufactured by a corporation not a party
to this action. Plaintiff sought recovery based upon negligence and strict
liability in tort. The jury found for the plaintiff only on the count al-
leging negligence. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, held, affirmed: The manufacturer of a harmless com-
ponent is liable in negligence to a third party harmed by the end product
containing such component, based upon the prominent location of the
component manufacturer's trade-mark on the label and its active role
in producing and advertising the product. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and
Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969).
The landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' signaled
the close of an era in which the negligent manufacturer was protected
from third-party liability by the absence of a contractual relationship.
The Court of Appeals of New York, led by Justice Cardozo, replaced
the burden of privity of contract imposed by Winterbottom v. Wright2
with the more realistic test of foreseeable danger.' With the advent of
27. The difference in the theoretical basis of liability is not wholly academic, for damages
recoverable in tort may be more comprehensive than those recoverable in contract. The con-
tractual theory, in other words, may not compensate a depositor for his total loss; see 22
Am. JUR. 2d Damages § 18 (1965). The bank in the instant case asserted that if a breach
of contract was stated, the complaint would nevertheless be insufficient for failure to allege
recoverable damages. The court disposed of the argument by citing 25 C.J.S. Damages
§ 50(e) (1966), and the cases cited therein, which suggest that when a breach of contract
results in the necessity to defend an action against third parties, recovery of attorney's fees
incurred in the prior litigation should be allowed in the action for breach of contract.
28. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) ; Tournier v.
Nat'l Provincial & Union Bank, [19241 1 K.B. 461.
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
3. The court stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made . . . [and] there is . . . knowledge that the thing will
